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1. Introduction 
This paper examines the benefits of social pacts from the point of view of the economic 
system as a whole and their costs for the trade unions, and the various possibilities open 
to facilitate their formation. 
The economic literature, from Barro and Gordon (1983b) to Lawler (2000a, 2000b; 
2001) or Berger et al. (2004), has put the strategic opposition of interests between 
unions and the government at the forefront of analysis.1 In such a context, economists 
have discussed three main, often interrelated, solutions to improve macroeconomic 
                                                 
* The authors acknowledge the financial support from the MIUR. 
1 See Cubitt (1992, 1995), Gylfason and Lindbeck (1994), Guzzo and Velasco (1999), Cukierman and 
Lippi (1999, 2001), Jerger (2002), Lippi (2003) and Coricelli et al. (2004, 2006). See also Gärtner (2000) 
and Cukierman (2004). The former surveys the traditional approach; the latter summarizes the recent 
development that combines the monopolistic labor- and goods-market distortions. 
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performance: the conservative central banker, union coordination (centralization), and 
corporatism (the cooperative solution between the government and the union).  
The delegation of monetary policy to a conservative central banker has characterized the 
discussion from the very beginning, from Barro and Gordon (1983b) to Soskice and 
Iversen (1998, 2000) and Coricelli et al. (2004, 2006), but with some opposition (see 
Cubitt, 1992; Skott, 1997; Cukierman and Lippi, 1999; Guzzo and Velasco, 1999; 
Lawler, 2000a, 2001). The central idea of advocates of central bank conservativeness is 
to create a credible commitment to a non-inflationary policy, thus eliminating the 
inflation bias. However, a full commitment proves to be sub-optimal if short-run 
fluctuations are considered, since in this case output variability is not reduced. A 
conservative central banker would guarantee better performance in the case of supply 
shocks (Rogoff, 1985). More recently, Coricelli et al. (2004, 2006) have shown that a 
conservative central banker can also be beneficial because it eliminates negative wage 
externalities in decentralized wage-setting systems. 2  However, in this case the 
conservative central banker is just an imperfect substitute for the lack of union 
coordination (Guzzo and Velasco, 1999), and wage centralization may be a Pareto 
superior solution (Acocella and Di Bartolomeo, 2004).3 
A parallel strand of analysis, also begun with Barro and Gordon (1983b), has focused 
on the possibility of reaching Pareto superior equilibria by implementing some kind of 
cooperative solution. This is the strand we are mainly interested in, but – as we will see 
– this solution interacts with that of the conservative central banker. By considering 
repeated games, Barro and Gordon (1983b) and followers have shown that Pareto 
superior equilibria may emerge as an effect of the creation of a reputation. This line of 
research has two main shortcomings: first, the conditions required to support 
cooperative Pareto-superior solutions are rather restrictive; second, the cooperative 
solution that can emerge in this strand of analysis improves macroeconomic 
performance only insofar as inflation is concerned, which is not the central point of 
many social pacts. 
                                                 
2 In fact, multi-union wage setting produces well-known negative externalities. The most relevant from an 
empirical point of view is the wage externality: an increase in one union’s nominal (real) wage results in a 
price increase and thus in a reduction of the real wage of the other unions. 
3 Assuming the existence of only one union – as we do in this paper – avoids confusing the issue of the 
absence of union coordination with that of a strategic conflict between the union(s) and the government. 
The existence of many competing unions could also affect negotiations with the government. However, 
we feel that this aspect has been of minor importance in the experience of social pacts (see, Visser, 2006). 
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More interesting from our perspective are the attempts to describe cooperative solutions 
in one-shot games as the result of explicit social pacts. Gylfason and Lindbeck (1994), 
Cubitt (1995), Burda (1997), Acocella, Di Bartolomeo and Tirelli (2007) show that 
corporatism is a possible solution to the conflict between the union(s) and the 
government, capable of guaranteeing better macroeconomic performance in terms of 
both inflation and employment.  
However, a problem of discovering the conditions favoring the acceptance of social 
pacts may arise with respect to both this and the previous solution, as the parties 
involved tend to pursue their own interests (Avdagic et al., 2005).4 In fact, the union 
preference function may fail to include inflation and certainly includes the real wage 
rate, which tends to be inversely related to employment: the higher level of employment 
guaranteed in many cases by corporatism raises the union utility level; however, since it 
implies a lower real wage rate, it can ultimately reduce union satisfaction (Acocella and 
Di Bartolomeo, 2007).  
In this paper we explicitly consider compensation to the union as a condition which may 
be needed to some extent in the formation of social pacts, under different preferences of 
the parties involved (in particular, the union’s inflation aversion and partisanship, and 
the government’s degree of conservatism). More specifically, we make use of a model 
that captures three different institutional setups already used in the analysis of the 
conflict between unions and the government in one-shot games (i.e. Barro and Gordon, 
1983a; Detken and Gartner, 1992; Gylfason and Lindbeck, 1994). 
The various solutions to the problem of feasibility of social pacts that we consider from 
a theoretical point of view have a factual counterpart. However, a comparative empirical 
                                                 
4 In the text we have indicated a problem of choosing between different analytical routes to explain how a 
social pact can emerge even if one of the parties involved does not gain from superior macroeconomic 
performance. These different routes might not be alternative to one another, as in real life we find 
different types of cooperative agreements (see Rhodes 1998, 2001; Avdagic et al., 2005). There are cases 
of long-term, well-institutionalized and comprehensive concertation as well as cases of short-medium 
term, episodic social pacts with narrow wage targets. In principle we could model them differently. More 
specifically, the former could be modelled as repeated games, whereas the latter could be the outcome of 
one shot games. For the sake of simplicity we prefer not to make this distinction, which might be carried 
out with more complicated models. In any case, a problem of feasibility would also arise if one tried to 
model social pacts as the result of repeated games, insofar as the macroeconomic model postulated an 
inverse relation between wages and employment and the preference function of the union conforms to the 
features that we present in the text. 
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analysis of the extent to which different conditions in various countries have facilitated 
the formation of social pacts lies beyond the scope of this paper.5 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the economic setup for 
the analysis. Section 3 discusses the different solutions to the problem of acceptance of 
social pacts by unions. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. The economic benchmark 
We consider a simple economic benchmark where the employment gap is endogenously 
determined by a strategic private sector organized in an all-encompassing union. The 
model harbors three different institutional scenarios: the standard case of long-run6 
monetary policy neutrality à la Barro and Gordon (1983a); the union inflation aversion 
case introduced by Gylfason and Lindbeck (1994) and Cubitt (1995);7 a partisan case, 
as in Detken and Gartner (1992). 
The model formally consists of four equations. The first two describe the supply and 
demand sides of the economy. 
(1) n wπ= −  
(2) n m π= −  
where n is the employment gap with respect to the potential (competitive) level, m is the 
nominal money growth rate, w is the wage growth rate, π is the inflation rate, w π−  is 
the real wage premium with respect to the competitive real wage. Equation (1) is a 
profit maximization condition and equation (2) a quantitative equation. The model is not 
stochastic; the introduction of additive stochastic disturbances or observed shocks does 
not affect our results, unless private information is introduced.8  
The model is closed by specifying the government’s and union’s preferences, which 
depend on the variables representing the macroeconomic performance of the system, 
formally: 
(3) 2 2
2 2
VV nκβ π= − −  
                                                 
5 See Rhodes (1998, 2001), Traxler and Kittel (2000) or Visser (2002). 
6  As usual in this literature, long-run is defined here in Friedman’s sense, i.e. the time needed for 
expectations to be adjusted. 
7 Criticism of this assumption has been levelled by Berger et al. (2004), among others. 
8 Results are also not neutral with respect to more complex stochastic structures such as Bayesian or 
Knightian uncertainty. However, the study of the problem in such structures is beyond the scope of the 
present paper. 
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(4) ( ) 2 2
2 2
UU w n Vκ ηα π π= − − − +Ω  
Equation (3) defines the preference function9 for the government, which aims to achieve 
the potential output and stabilize inflation by setting the money growth rate. Parameters 
β and Vκ measure the government’s marginal rate of substitution between the targets; in 
particular, as usual, we refer to β as the conservatism degree.  
Equation (4) is the union’s loss function, which increases linearly in the wage premium, 
by a parameter α. The union controls w. Parameters η and Uκ have an interpretation 
similar to those of the government. The union’s loss function may also depend on the 
government utility, if 0.Ω ≠  In other words, Ω  indicates how much the union supports 
(dislikes) the current government.  
We assume 0β η> ≥  and ( )2 ,1U Vκ κΩ∈ − . The meaning of these technical 
assumptions is as follows. The former simply states that, even if the union is inflation 
averse, it is less so than the government; the latter implies that, even if the union is 
partisan, it cares less about the result of the election than the supported party. If these 
assumptions are removed, a number of rather implausible results from an economic 
point of view could be obtained, e.g. the union would like to pay a transfer to the 
government in order to increase the unemployment rate.   
Players’ preferences are expressed in rather general terms, which allow us to compare 
our results to those of the cited literature in accordance with different assumptions about 
the preference parameters. As claimed, the model harbors three different common 
setups:10 1) the Barro-Gordon model, when 0η = , 0Ω = . We refer to this case as “the 
standard scenario”; 2) the Gylfason-Lindbeck model,11 when 0η > , 0Ω = . We refer to 
this case as “the inflation-averse union scenario”; 3) the Detken-Gartner model, when 
0η = , 0Ω ≠ . We refer to this case as “the partisan scenario”. 
The interpretation of the preference functions can therefore be different in the different 
scenarios. For instance, if we consider the case of a partisan union, equation (3) should 
be interpreted as a vote function and the preference of the union (4) will also depend on 
                                                 
9 According to one possible interpretation, as we discuss later, equation (3) could also be interpreted as a 
vote function. 
10 See Di Bartolomeo (2006) for further details. 
11 This is the version of the Gylfason-Lindbeck model used and explained in Acocella and Ciccarone 
(1997). 
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the probability of the government’s re-election. Moreover, note that a preference 
function of the type (3) is a general representation of social welfare as in the standard 
policy games between the private sector and the central bank. Different specifications 
are possible (see e.g. Acocella et al., 2007). However, a complete discussion of the 
nature of the players’ preferences is beyond the scope of the present paper.12  
The Nash non-cooperative solution implies:  
(5) ( ) ( )N U V Vn
βα
κ κ β η β κ= − +Ω + +Ω  
(6) ( ) ( )N VU V V
κ απ κ κ β η β κ= +Ω + +Ω  
The non-cooperative values for the government’s and union’s utilities are: 
(7) ( )( )
2
22
V V
U V
NV κ β κ βαβκ η β κ
+
+ +Ω⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
= −  
(8) ( )( )( )
2 2 2 2 2
2
2 3
2
V V V V U V V
U V
NU κ η βκ βηκ β κ κ β κ β κ βαβκ η β κ
+Ω − − Ω − +
+ +Ω⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
= −  
Equation (5) displays the general result of non-neutrality since employment depends on 
the government’s preferences. This result vanishes in the standard scenario when 
neutrality holds. An inflation-averse union implies a trade-off for the government: 
setting a lower level of inflation because of a higher preference for price stability 
produces a lower level of employment. However, in this scenario macroeconomic 
performance is better than in the standard one. Performance also depends on the attitude 
of the union with respect to the government. Union partisanship introduces the 
possibility of a political business cycle. In fact, it improves (does not improve) 
macroeconomic performance if the union supports (dislikes) the current government as 
it follows a more moderate (aggressive) wage policy. An inflation bias always arises, as 
indicated by equation (6). The “race” between wages and money in the determination of 
employment generates a social cost in terms of inflation, i.e. the non-cooperative 
outcome in terms of employment can be achieved with non-zero inflation. 
                                                 
12 See in particular, among others, Gylfason and Lindbeck (1994), Acocella and Ciccarone (1997), and 
Cukierman (2004) for a general discussion and the difference between the welfare function and the 
union’s loss as preferences of a specific group; Oswald (1985), Cubitt (1995) for a detailed taxonomy of 
the union’s preference functions; Detken and Gartner (1992) for the partisan union and the vote function 
of the government; Berger et al. (2004) for criticism of the introduction of inflation aversion in the 
union’s preference; Burda (1997), Mares (2004, 2006), and Acocella et al. (2007) for the inclusion of 
additional arguments in the preference function of the government and the union. 
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3. Compensation and other institutions favoring social pacts. 
3.1. The cooperative solution. 
As shown in a number of papers, the macroeconomic performance offered by non-
cooperative solutions can be improved by resorting to corporatism, i.e. cooperative 
social pacts between the union and the government.13 However, an improvement in 
macroeconomic performance might not be in the interest of the union, and problems of 
the feasibility of corporatism might arise, e.g. in the case of low union inflation aversion 
and a low degree of partisanship, as the union loses from a reduction in the employment 
gap, which is associated with a reduction in the real wage (see Acocella and Di 
Bartolomeo, 2007).  
To reconcile formal models with reality – where social pacts have been rather common, 
in Europe at least – some kind of compensation14 must be given by the government to 
the union to induce it to sign a social pact. Our model already incorporates features that 
can be interpreted as a sort of compensation – the union’s inflation aversion and the 
partisanship – or could make social pacts more attractive, by improving non-cooperative 
solutions, and thus acting as a substitute for compensation. 
By adding explicit compensation to the model we can examine the interplay of different 
institutional features for the acceptance of social pacts by unions. If a transfer 0t ≥  is 
paid by the government to the union, equations (3) and (4) change as follows:  
(9) V V t= −  
(10) U U t= +  
The inclusion of a linear transfer does not affect the Nash non-cooperative equilibrium 
since, by considering equations (9) and (10), the Nash equilibrium is still given by 
equations (5)-(6) and t = 0. We can then calculate the cooperative solution by 
maximizing the Nash product: 
(11) ( ) ( )1N B NU U V Vδ δ−Π = − −   
                                                 
13 See, e.g., Cubitt (1995), Burda (1997), Caeyers and Pauwels (2006), Mares (2004, 2006), Acocella and 
Di Bartolomeo (2007), Acocella, Di Bartolomeo and Tirelli (2007). 
14 In this term we include “issue linkages,” “political exchange,” delegation of public functions to unions, 
in addition to side payments, which are the most evident case of compensation. We deal with these more 
extensively in Acocella, Di Bartolomeo and Pauwels (2006). 
 8
with respect to { }, ,w m t  subject to equations (1) and (2). For the sake of simplicity, we 
assume that the two agents have equal bargaining power, i.e. 12δ −= .  
The cooperative solution implies: 
(12) ( )1C U Vn
α
κ κ= − + +Ω  
(13) 0Cπ =  
(14) 
( ) ( )
2
C C N C C N
C V t V U t Ut
− − + + −=  
In the cooperative solution employment is a function of a multiplicity of parameters, but 
is always higher than in the non-cooperative solution (see equation (5)). Inflation is 
always zero, thus lower than the non cooperative value (see equation (6)).  
The transfer indicated by equation (14) is expressed in implicit form and reflects the 
division of the surplus between the two players. Equation (14) simply stresses that the 
transfer is the payment that equates the gains in the utilities of the two players deriving 
from cooperation. In fact, it is an average of the government’s gains from cooperation, 
net of the transfer itself, and the union’s gains, including the transfer.15  
Two different issues arise from this cooperative solution: 
1. Why does corporatism improve macroeconomic performance and what are the 
different mechanisms at work in this case with respect to the non-cooperative 
solution? 
2. What determines the amount of the transfer required to support social pacts? 
These issues will be dealt with in the next two sub-sections. 
3.2. Corporatism and the macroeconomic performance. 
In comparing the cooperative levels of employment and inflation (equations (12) and 
(13)) with those in the non-cooperative cases (equations (5) and (6)), we notice that 
cooperation always induces better performance in terms of both. 
In the cooperative solution inflation is always zero, independently of any parameter. 
The rationale for this result lies in the fact that inflation proves to be a Pareto inferior 
outcome of non-cooperative bargaining, induced by the wage-money race, and can be 
thus disposed of by cooperatively setting money growth and the wage rate. More 
                                                 
15 As we assume equal bargaining power for the players, in (19) the average is actually the mean of the 
gains of the two players. 
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specifically, zero inflation is achieved since the players share the same inflation target, 
which can be reached independently of the employment level; thus no conflict arises 
between them.16   
Once the government and the union have ruled inflation out through cooperation, they 
can concentrate on choosing the level of the employment gap. The desired (first-best) 
value of the employment gap is zero for the government and positive for the union, 
whose first best is equal to ( ) 1U Vα κ κ −− + Ω .17 Cooperative employment lies between 
these two first-best outcomes.  
Cooperation thus tends to increase government’s utility, because of better 
macroeconomic performance, and causes disutility for the union, calling for some 
compensation. Indeed the union can be compensated by the reduction in inflation, if it is 
inflation averse, or by the mere acceptance of higher government satisfaction, if it is 
partisan. Such cases are possible, but are ruled out by our assumptions.18  
By comparing the non-cooperative outcomes to the cooperative ones in the different 
scenarios, it is easy to check that the gains in terms of inflation and employment are 
higher in the standard case than in the inflation-averse or partisan-union scenarios when 
the union supports the current government. Conversely, they are lower if the union 
dislikes the government.  
However, in all cases the cooperative level of employment is independent of the 
players’ preferences for inflation as well as the non-cooperative levels of employment 
and inflation (i.e. the players’ outside options), since, as noted, the cooperative values of 
the macroeconomic outcomes only depend on their first-best values. By contrast, 
different institutional settings influence the amount of the transfer that supports the 
cooperative solution by affecting the marginal cost/benefit of the union and government.  
 
                                                 
16 The elimination of the inflation bias is always a Pareto improvement. More specifically, it represents a 
weak (strong) Pareto improvement if the union dislikes (does not dislike) inflation. Recall that the union 
dislikes inflation in the cases of both a partisan and an inflation-averse union, as the union pays 
compensation to sign a pact with the government.  
17 First-best outcomes are easily obtained by differentiating players’ utilities with respect to π and n after 
taking account of (1) and (2). 
18 These cases would require that the union care about inflation more than the government does or that the 
union care about the government’s utility more than its own. They are not emphasized because they are 
not empirically relevant. In addition, they may support some perverse mechanisms that contrast with the 
stylized economic facts regarding social pacts, e.g. a transfer paid by the union to increase unemployment. 
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3.3. The determinants of transfers. 
3.3.1. General determinants. 
As claimed, cooperative inflation and output are only determined by the first-best values 
of these variables. Once the optimal values of inflation and employment are determined, 
the transfer is simply a residual indicating the payment that supports the cooperative 
solution, i.e. the transfer that implies an equal division of the surplus arising from 
cooperation. More specifically, after cumbersome algebra, the expression for the 
transfer can be rewritten as:  
(15) ( ) ( ) 211 12 2 2C N N U VV Ct U V nκ κκ + +Ω⎛ ⎞= − − +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠   
Although not intuitive, as we will also show later, the transfer is always positive, at least 
in the economically relevant cases reflected by our assumptions. 
This depends on a multiplicity of factors, but some of them should be underscored. First, 
understandably, it is larger the higher the level of the union’s utility in the non-
cooperative case, which gives the reserve option for this player (who tends to lose from 
cooperation), and smaller the higher the level of the government’s non-cooperative 
utility, as the government gains from cooperating. In addition, the transfer is inversely 
related to the cooperative employment gap: higher employment rates call for higher 
transfers, as both the loss to the union and the government’s gain from cooperating 
increase. By contrast, there is no relation between the transfer and the level of 
cooperative inflation, since both players always reach their first-best inflation rates, i.e. 
zero. To put these remarks in another useful perspective, we can say that the transfer is 
higher the greater the increase in performance in terms of employment (i.e. the rise in 
employment deriving from cooperation). The non-cooperative level of inflation affects 
the transfer in a similar manner. However, its effect depends on the union’s attitude 
with respect to it; e.g. if the union is indifferent to inflation, a lower rate of non-
cooperative inflation reduces the government’s gain from cooperation and does not 
affects that of the union, thus implying a smaller transfer, as we will see in detail when 
analyzing the effects of conservativeness in the different scenarios. 
Looking at the factors that lie behind the net cost of cooperating for the union, anything 
that increases the union’s outside option (by lowering inflation or increasing 
employment in the non-cooperative case) or the cost of an increase in employment 
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requires a larger transfer, while the opposite is true if we consider the outside option of 
the government and the benefit associated with the increase in employment.  
An increase in the preference for the wage premium α thus implies a larger transfer by 
reducing the union’s first-best employment. For the same reason, an increase in κU 
reduces it, but the impact on the amount of the transfer can be ambiguous since this also 
reduces the cost of the increase in employment deriving from cooperation. Nevertheless, 
as we will show, in all scenarios considered here the effect favoring a transfer reduction 
dominates.  
As regards the government’s preferences, the effects of κV can be more complex: it 
affects not only the government’s preferences but also that of the partisan union. 
However, in all the scenarios considered the effect favoring an increase in transfers 
dominates. Conservatism plays a role in transfers only to the extent to which it affects 
the non-cooperative solution, as will be made clearer below with reference to the 
different scenarios. Similarly, the union’s preference for inflation has no impact on 
inflation or employment because it does not affect first-best outcomes, and inflation 
costs are completely internalized in the cooperative solution. By contrast, its role in 
determining the transfer is ambiguous.  
The many determinants of transfers make it extremely difficult to add other insights in 
the general case. They can be better analyzed with reference to the specific scenarios, 
where we focus in particular on the degree of conservatism.  
3.3.2. The standard scenario. 
As we can derive from (5) and (6), in the standard scenario (i.e. assuming 0η =  and 
0Ω = ), in the non-cooperative solution there is a high inflation bias and employment 
equals the union’s first best. In addition, non-neutrality of monetary policy holds and an 
increase in β only reduces the inflation bias.  
The transfer is given by the following expression:  
(16) ( )
2 2
2 2
31
4
C U V V
UU V
t κ κ κ αβ κκ κ
⎡ ⎤+= +⎢ ⎥+⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
The transfer is positive and increasing in α and κV and decreasing in κU. As the union 
has no interest in avoiding inflation, the amount of the transfer, ceteris paribus, is larger 
in this case than in the other scenarios.  
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Our general claims can easily be verified by inspecting equation (16). By differentiation 
it is simple to derive that, in the standard scenario, transfers are an inverse function of 
the degree of conservatism. Conservativeness has no effect on the gain in non-
cooperative employment, but influences the reduction in non-cooperative inflation in 
accordance with Rogoff’s well-known prediction. The reduction in inflation in the non-
cooperative case lowers the government’s benefit from cooperating and then – so to 
speak – its ability to pay and, thus, the amount of the transfer. This effect is all the 
greater the larger the weight put on inflation by the government. Conservatism acts as a 
substitute for side payments in the sense that an increase in conservatism reduces the 
amount of compensation to be paid. In other words, it reduces the Government’s gains 
(in terms of a better macroeconomic performance) of an agreement, thus making the 
agreement less desirable, ceteris paribus.  
3.3.3. The inflation-averse union scenario. 
As we can derive from (5) and (6), in the inflation-averse scenario (i.e. 0,η > 0Ω = ), in 
the non-cooperative solution an inflation bias still exists, but it is smaller than in the 
standard case, whereas the employment gap is larger (smaller) than the union’s 
(government’s) first-best outcome.  
The transfer is given by: 
(17) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
2
2 2
2 2
3
4
V U U V U VC
V
U V U V
t
βκ ηκ βκ ηκ κ κβ η κ ακ κ βκ ηκ
+ + + + += − + +  
The transfer is always positive and tends to zero as the players tend to have the same 
preference for inflation. 
Now money is non-neutral, and an increase in β still implies a smaller inflation bias 
(and, thus, a lower benefit from cooperating for both the government and the union), but 
it also reduces the non-cooperative employment gap and, thus, the benefit (cost) of 
cooperation for the government (the union). Thus, an increase in β reduces the benefit 
of cooperation for the government and has a mixed effect on the union, which has a 
lower cost from the lower increase in employment and a lower benefit from the smaller 
inflation bias in the non-cooperative solution. The net effect of an increase in 
conservatism on the amount of the transfer thus depends on the relative degree of the 
conservatism itself as well as the union’s weights for inflation and employment.  
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Formally, for high values of the union’s inflation aversion relative to its preference for 
the output gap (more specifically, for 2Uη κ> ), 0Ct β∂ ∂ > ; for lower values of the 
union’s inflation aversion ( 2Uη κ< ), 0Ct β∂ ∂ >  holds only for small values of β.19  
In this scenario conservatism may act as substitute for side payments for relatively low 
values of the union’s inflation aversion, for high values of the union’s preference for 
employment and for rather high degrees of conservatism itself.  
3.3.4. The partisan union scenario. 
As we can derive from (5) and (6), in the partisanship scenario (i.e. 0, 0ηΩ ≠ = ), the 
inflation bias and unemployment are lower (higher) than in the standard case when the 
union supports (dislikes) the current government, since in this case -- as in Detken and 
Gärtner (1992) -- the union will set a lower (higher) wage to favor (disfavor) the 
Government.  
The transfer is given by the following expression: 
(18) ( )( )( )
( )
( )
2 2
2
2 2
6 3 11
4 21
V U V U V VC
U VU V
t
κ κ κ κ κ κ αβ κ κκ κ
⎡ ⎤Ω + + Ω+ + −Ω⎢ ⎥= +⎢ ⎥ + Ω+ +Ω⎣ ⎦
 
In the case of union partisanship, in principle, the transfer can be either positive or 
negative, depending on the value of Ω. However, in our framework, as the values of Ω 
are within the limits imposed, it is always positive.  
It is a direct function of the preference of the union for the real wage, an inverse 
function of the degree of conservatism and the weight assigned to employment by the 
union. Thus conservatism acts as a substitute for side payments.  
The derivative of t with respect to Ω is difficult to calculate in analytical terms. 
Numerical simulations show that it is negative: the more partisan is the union, the 
smaller is the transfer it needs in order to sign a social pact.  
 
4. Concluding remarks 
Corporatism guarantees better macroeconomic performance, but might give rise to a net 
cost to the union. Considering the usual models where the union’s loss function is a 
                                                 
19 The results can be easily derived by differentiation.  
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function of the real wage rate and employment only, the union could suffer from a 
higher level of employment if it values this less than the corresponding wage restraint. 
The widespread existence of social pacts can be explained by introducing additional 
variables into the usual models, such as side payments or more complex union 
preference functions than the usual ones. Side payments are often made to unions in 
various forms, such as transfers proper, issue linkages, political exchange or delegation 
of public functions. In particular, in the social pacts of the 1970s, the so-called first-
generation pacts, increases in public expenditure played an important role in supporting 
cooperative solutions (see Visser, 2002). 
The union’s inflation aversion can also help reduce or eliminate the cost of social pacts. 
If the union dislikes inflation, it gains directly from the inflation reduction resulting 
from the cooperative solution. Unions’ inflation aversion seems to have been of the 
utmost importance in some countries (e.g. Germany) for the entire post-war period for 
historical reasons. Unions’ inflation aversion or partisanship seem to have played some 
role at times (e.g., in the 1970s, the 1980s and the early 1990s) in other countries as well 
(in the last decade, in conjunction with the need for disinflation related to meeting the 
Maastricht criteria).20 
Partisanship can reduce inflation and increase employment even with little or no side 
payment. This helps explain wage moderation and bipartite social pacts in the absence 
of explicit compensation in countries where the other substitutes for compensation do 
not operate. 
The government’s conservatism has no impact on cooperative solutions, but always 
affects the transfer that supports the cooperative solution. By decreasing non-
cooperative inflation, it tends to reduce the gains from cooperation for the government. 
Accordingly, in the standard case it acts as a substitute for side payments. However, in 
the case of monetary non-neutrality, by decreasing the non-cooperative employment gap, 
it also tends to increase the gain (cost) of cooperating for the government (the union), 
and its effects may therefore be ambiguous. Therefore, in the inflation-averse union case, 
higher conservatism only increases the amount of the transfer under certain 
circumstances, mainly when the employment effect dominates the inflation effect. 
                                                 
20 See Visser (2002), Acocella, Di Bartolomeo and Tirelli (2007). 
 15
Partisanship makes this happen always, and thus conservatism is always a substitute for 
side payments in the partisan case. 
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